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Abstract
The assumption that increasing diversity and economic hardship boost support for 
the far right is widespread, yet extant research comes up with contradictory findings. 
This article investigates the link between context and the far right by investigating 
the impact of immigration and unemployment on voting for Marine Le Pen in the 
first round of the 2017 French Presidential election. We match a large individual-
level survey with contextual variables constructed from the census describing vot-
ers’ residential environments. Unlike previous studies, we measure immigration and 
unemployment at the neighborhood level and the broader level of the department. 
Using a multilevel model, we find that voters in neighborhoods with high levels 
of immigration are less likely to vote for the far right. However, in departments, 
increased immigration and unemployment correlate with greater support for Le 
Pen. These findings suggest that contact theory and ethnic threat operate differently 
according to spatial scale.
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It is a commonly held assumption that the increased presence of immigrants in 
European societies has in part spurred the success of the far right, particularly in 
times of economic crisis. In line with this assumption, a broad stream of research 
has investigated the role of contextual characteristics in political choice, focusing 
specifically on how indicators such as immigrant shares or unemployment rates cor-
relate with the success of anti-immigrant parties (Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and 
Carter 2006; Dinas and van Spanje 2011; Enos 2017; Georgiadou et al. 2018; Halla 
et al. 2017; Knigge 1998; Savelkoul et al. 2017; Scheepers et al. 2002; Scheve and 
Slaughter 2001; Wagner et al. 2006).
Yet, despite this widespread conviction, there is still little agreement regarding 
which spatial features drive the far-right vote or the influence that these features 
have. For instance, a recent meta-analysis found that out of a total of 291  tests of 
the association between immigration shares and far-right voting at the sub-national 
level, 36% of the analyses report a positive effect, 14% a negative effect, while the 
rest of the studies find no association (Amengay and Stockemer 2018). A similar 
meta-analysis found that the effect of unemployment on support for the far right was 
also inconsistent across studies (Sipma and Lubbers 2018).
These discrepancies stem in part from competing theoretical expectations, but 
they are also rooted in diverging methodological choices that characterize this 
stream of research. Most studies only rely on macro-level data. Although useful 
for documenting associations between contextual characteristics and voting pat-
terns, macro approaches cannot establish whether neighborhood factors such as 
immigration are a significant predictor of individual voting behavior net of socio-
demographics that sort people into residential locations. Moreover, the spatial scales 
at which contextual characteristics are measured vary considerably, from national 
to regional to departmental levels, and rarely do studies investigate these effects at 
small spatial scales or account for multiple scales at once.
In this article, we aim to increase the current understanding of the link between 
spatial characteristics and the far right by investigating the impact of local immigra-
tion and unemployment on voting for Marine Le Pen in the first round of the 2017 
French Presidential election. To this end, using geographic ID codes, we match a 
large N individual-level survey with contextual variables constructed from the cen-
sus describing voters’ residential environments.1 Unlike previous studies that rely 
on ecological data at large levels of aggregation, we measure immigration and 
unemployment at the smallest available spatial scale in French data, the neighbor-
hood (“IRIS”), as well as the broader level of the department, using a multilevel 
model. Indeed, we find contrasting associations between context and far-right voting 
depending on the spatial unit. Specifically, we find that, in line with contact theory, 
voters in neighborhoods with high levels of immigration are less likely to vote for 




the far right, while at the same time, increased immigration and unemployment at 
the department level correlate with an increased support for Le Pen.
These findings contribute to the literature on residential context and far-right vot-
ing in three ways. First, we offer an assessment of contextual effects at the local level 
by examining how far-right voting varies across neighborhoods. While recent studies 
have explored neighborhood-level variation in far-right voting, these have relied on 
aggregate level data only (Steinmayr 2016; Halla et al. 2017). Second, we assess the 
effect of the neighborhood immigrant share and unemployment rate on individual 
voting behavior net of social and demographic characteristics, attitudes, and other 
geographic controls. Because we account for individual characteristics that influence 
both the likelihood of voting for the far right and residential location (i.e. educa-
tional levels or immigrant origin), our model provides a more robust estimate of the 
effect of neighborhoods ceteris paribus than studies relying on aggregate-level data. 
Third, by integrating two spatial levels into the analysis, we show that the effects of 
immigration and unemployment vary according to scale.
Theoretical Perspectives on Context and Far‑Right Voting
The most common theoretical perspectives on the association between contextual 
characteristics and the vote are economic competition, contact theory, and ethnic 
threat. The economic competition hypothesis (Scheepers et al. 2002) posits that eco-
nomic hardship in a residential environment should increase competition between 
natives and immigrants over scarce resources such as jobs, benefits, or public hous-
ing. Consequently, this competition will render voters more susceptible to the anti-
immigrant platform of the far right that typically places special emphasis on the neg-
ative economic impacts of immigration. The most commonly used aggregate index 
to test the economic competition hypothesis is the level of unemployment at the 
national or subnational level (Amengay and Stockemer 2018; Golder 2003; Jackman 
and Volpert 1996; Knigge 1998; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002). However, empirical 
support for the economic threat hypothesis is inconclusive given several contradic-
tory findings (Amengay and Stockemer 2018; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Knigge 
1998; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002). Some studies document a positive effect of 
unemployment on the far-right vote (Arzheimer 2009; Jackman and Volpert 1996; 
Lubbers and Scheepers 2000), while others find no association (Golder 2003; Green 
et al. 2016), and still others report a negative effect (Lubbers et al. 2002).
Whereas the economic competition hypothesis attempts to explain far-right vot-
ing based on material concerns, the mechanisms central to contact theory and ethnic 
threat relate to the mere presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in a locality 
regardless of economic conditions. Several research programs draw on the premises 
of intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998) to argue that living in 
proximity to ethnic minorities and immigrants creates opportunities for interaction 
that increase inter-group tolerance, which in turn translates into lower support for 
anti-immigrant parties (Jolly and DiGiusto 2014; Wagner et al. 2006). These stud-
ies  therefore predict a negative relationship between immigrant presence and far-
right voting. In contrast, ethnic threat posits that the presence of ethnic minorities 
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in a local population triggers cultural and ethnic resentment (Anderson 1996; Coffé 
et al. 2007; Knigge 1998; Halla et al. 2017; Hangartner et al. 2019; Savelkoul et al. 
2017). Vote shares for the far right should hence be higher in areas with larger shares 
of immigrants, as voters will turn to anti-immigration parties because they feel that 
immigration threatens their cultural values, national identity, and the ethnic homo-
geneity of the country (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012).
Some research in this vein points out that contact mechanisms or ethnic threat 
may not be triggered by minority group size alone. According to the salience-of-
change hypothesis, Newman and Velez (2014) instead argue that citizens are sen-
sitive to the growth over time of local immigrant populations rather than overall 
levels of immigrants. Empirically, this hypothesis calls for studies that test how far-
right voting changes in  reaction to fluctuations in local composition, such as sud-
den inflows of migrants into a neighborhood (Steinmayr 2016; Halla et  al. 2017). 
Further, the nature of geographical proximity between immigrants and natives 
may be different in such cases of rapid population change, especially when inflows 
are temporary, as in the case of refugee arrivals. In such cases, even if exposure 
to migrants in the local area occurs, sustained contact that would foster in-group/
out-group interaction and tolerance may not necessarily take place (Hangartner et al. 
2019). As is the case with levels of unemployment, the empirical literature docu-
ments contrasting associations between levels of (or changes in) immigration and 
the far-right vote, varying from positive, negative or even no effects (Amengay and 
Stockemer 2018). In Belgium, Coffé et al. (2007) find a positive association between 
the number of immigrants at the municipality level and aggregate support for the far 
right, suggesting ethnic threat mechanisms. Similarly, in their analysis that matches 
individual-level data with the share of immigration at the neighborhood level, 
Savelkoul et al. (2017) illustrate a positive correlation between levels of immigration 
and voting for the far-right PVV, finding at the same time that interethnic contact 
plays a minimal role. Hangartner et al. (2019) report that refugee arrivals increased 
outgroup prejudice among the populations of the East Aegean Greek islands that 
experienced significant refugee inflows. On the other hand, drawing on Swiss survey 
data, Green et al. (2016) find evidence of contact theory in terms of self-reported 
interactions with immigrants, but still find that an increase of the immigrant share 
at the extra-local level bolsters ethnic threat. Even similar aggregate-level analyses 
from the same national context produce contrasting results: while Steinmayr (2016) 
shows that support for the far-right Austrian Freedom Party drops as refugee inflows 
into neighborhoods rise, indicating contact theory, Halla et al. (2017) find evidence 
of ethnic threat as immigrant shares increase.
Variations According to Spatial Scale
One way of understanding these seemingly contradictory findings is to consider var-
iations related to spatial scale. Extant literature typically draws on data that measure 
contextual characteristics at broad aggregate levels, such as municipalities (Dinas 
and Van Spanje 2011), departments (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000, 2002; Rojon 
2013), regions (Jolly and DiGiusto 2014; Georgiadou et al. 2018), or even the whole 
1 3
Political Behavior 
country (Arzheimer 2009; Golder 2003; Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002; Lucas-
sen and Lubbers 2012; Van der Brug et al. 2005).
Yet, these varying scales of aggregation could be capturing different social pro-
cesses impacting the vote (Della Posta 2013). Contact theory assumes that proxim-
ity to immigrants matters because frequent direct interactions dampen fears about 
the potential negative economic or cultural repercussions brought on by migration. 
Therefore, contact theory operates specifically at a local level, and its effect should 
only be observed when immigrant shares and voting behavior are compared at the 
neighborhood level.
On the other hand, if contact exists at the local level, ethnic threat might still be 
observed at the extra-local level. Some studies argue over the existence of a ‘halo 
effect’, according to which the propensity to vote for far-right parties increases in 
places near immigrant-dense areas rather than within the areas themselves (Per-
rineau 1997; Rydgren and Ruth 2013 but see Rydgren and Tyrberg 2020). This 
means that voters may feel hostility towards immigrants regardless of whether they 
have frequent contact with these groups in their neighborhoods. The local media in 
departments or regions with high levels of immigration likely plays a role by pro-
moting negative representations of immigration, crime and economic insecurity in 
an area, which heighten the salience of immigration and feelings of threat (Rojon 
2013; Green et al. 2016; Della Posta 2013).
Further, residential mobility dynamics may produce ethnic threat processes that 
are only observable at extra local scales. Research into white flight has documented 
that white households move out of local areas when the immigrant population 
reaches a certain threshold (Schelling 1969). These mobility patterns may be sus-
tained in part by groups with low tolerance to ethnic diversity whose support for 
anti-immigrant parties would likely be bolstered by the sentiment of having been 
“pushed out” of their residential areas by increasing numbers of immigrants. The 
relocation of extreme voters in the outskirts of large cities with high immigrant 
shares could produce ethnic threat at the broader level of the department or region. 
This would not exclude the possibility that contact mechanisms are still at play in 
local spaces with high shares of immigrants.
A few studies compare contact theory and ethnic threat at different spatial scales. 
Della Posta (2013) finds a positive association between department-level Front 
National vote shares in France and the foreign-born population share. However, this 
association is inversed when the smaller municipality level is examined. Similarly, 
Rojon (2013) shows evidence of ethnic threat in rural areas but not in urban areas. 
The importance of level of aggregation also emerges from the results of Green et al. 
(2016), who find simultaneous evidence of extra local ethnic threat and the attenua-
tion of far-right voting through interpersonal contact.
However, none of these studies use combined individual and neighborhood-level 
data to estimate contextual effects net of individual characteristics. This is a cru-
cial point given that individuals who move into immigrant areas tend to be demo-
graphically or culturally selected, i.e. they have characteristics that make them more 
favorable to immigrants and less likely to vote for the far right. For instance, people 
with high education and high socioeconomic status are more likely to be favorable 
towards immigration, less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties and more likely 
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to live in cities where immigrants are present (Kaufmann and Harris 2015; Maxwell 
2019). Our approach thus provides a more accurate estimate of the role of the neigh-
borhood and department ceteris paribus.
Finally, economic competition may also play out differently according to spa-
tial scale. As individuals have access to job markets that transcend the borders of 
their local residential area, competition between natives and immigrants for jobs or 
other resources likely occur at larger scales than the neighborhood. No studies to 
our knowledge compare economic conditions and far-right voting at local and extra-
local scales.
Context and Voting in France
France presents a case study for testing the effects of local immigration and unem-
ployment on the vote given its history of immigration and a highly successful far-
right party, the Front National (which was renamed National Rally in 2018). Long a 
country of immigration, France became an ethnoracially diverse society in the wake 
of decolonialization, as migrants and their families settled primarily in the peripher-
ies of major cities. Today, the foreign-born population and their direct descendants 
is estimated at about 20% of the population (Beauchemin et al. 2018). Unlike other 
Western societies, France does not recognize differentiations based on race/ethnic-
ity and consequently does not collect race/ethnicity in public statistics. Despite this 
colorblind tradition, the integration of immigrants and their descendants has become 
a salient and controversial political issue. The French Republican model of integra-
tion assumes that immigrants become French by successfully incorporating French 
values and losing signs of ethnic distinctiveness. But the perceived cultural distance 
of non-European immigrants and their offspring as well as the visibility of French 
Muslims have led many on the political right to blame minorities for their failed 
integration and “unassimiability.” Research has documented high levels of residen-
tial segregation among non-European immigrants and their children as well as white 
flight dynamics in France (Rathelot and Safi 2014; McAvay and Safi 2018; McAvay 
2018).
The far-right Front National has gained traction since the 1980s by framing immi-
gration as a scapegoat for economic hardship, increased unemployment, as well as a 
threat to national identity, stoking fears of insecurity and demographic invasion. The 
rise of the far right is further reflected in empirical evidence of anti-immigrant senti-
ment and ethnic prejudice in French society (Mayer et al. 2014). The party’s leader, 
Marine Le Pen, insists heavily on the association between increased immigration 
and unemployment, as well as the supposed undermining of the French welfare state 
caused by large numbers of immigrants. The spearhead of its electoral platform in 
recent elections has been the “national preference” policies that aim to prioritize 
French over foreigners on the labor market and decrease the cost of France’s welfare 
state by restricting access to natives only (see Mayer 2018; Shields 2013).
A few prior studies have tested how immigrant presence influences voting in 
France, with mixed evidence pointing to ethnic threat (Lubbers and Scheepers 2002; 
Mayer 2002; Della Posta 2013; Edo et  al. 2019; Rojon 2013) and contact theory 
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(Jolly and DiGiusto 2014; Della Posta 2013; Rojon 2013) depending on scale. No 
studies to our knowledge have looked at the influence of neighborhood-level char-
acteristics on voting in France or used a multilevel approach with individual and 
multiple contextual scales.
Hypotheses
Building on the above, we test the following hypotheses:
H1 In line with the premises of contact theory, we anticipate that voting for the far 
right will decrease with higher immigrant shares at the neighborhood level only.
H2 Ethnic threat processes will be observed only at a broader spatial scale. Voting 
for the far right will increase in departments with higher immigrant shares.
H3 As ethnic threat processes are canceled out by regular contact, higher immigrant 
shares at the neighborhood level will weaken the effect of higher immigrant shares 
in departments.
H4 As job market opportunities largely exceed neighborhood boundaries, increased 
unemployment will increase voting for the far right only at the department level due 
to economic competition.
Data and Methods
Data come from the 2017 French Electoral Survey (Enquête electorale française) 
produced by the CEVIPOF. The survey is a 17-wave panel that was conducted 
approximately every month between November 2015 and June 2017 on a repre-
sentative sample of around 25,000 respondents.2 Our analysis focuses on wave 14 
(April–May 2017) during which vote choice in the presidential election was meas-
ured (N = 15,807). Using the geographic ID code of each respondent, we match 
the Electoral Survey to neighborhood and department characteristics constructed 
from the 2015 French census. Neighborhood ID codes were not available for 14% 
of respondents in wave 14. Comparison of socio-demographics and the vote choice 
variable for the full sample (N = 15,807) and the sample of non-missing observa-
tions on neighborhood and all other variables used in the analysis (N = 12,613) 
shows nearly identical distributions, suggesting that sample selection due to missing 
values does not bias the representativity of the sample.3
2 See Table 3 for descriptive comparisons between the survey, the French census and prior presidential 
election resuts.




The dependent variable is the reported vote in the first round of the 2017 French 
presidential election, measured in April 2017 (Wave 14). It is coded as a dummy 
variable, indicating 1 if the respondent voted for the far-right candidate, Marine Le 
Pen (Front National) and 0 for any other candidate. Abstainers and blank ballots are 
not included in the analysis. We ran robustness checks to test the validity of our find-
ings if these categories are included; results do not change.
Contextual Characteristics
The main independent variables of interest are the immigrant share and unemploy-
ment rate in voters’ residential areas in 2015. These are continuous variables meas-
ured at two levels: the neighborhood (IRIS)4 and the department.5 The neighborhood 
(or department) immigrant share refers to the proportion of immigrants6 out of the 
entire neighborhood (or department) population. The unemployment rate measures 
the share of unemployed individuals out of the total active population of the neigh-
borhood or department. We further control for municipality size.7
Individual‑Level Demographics and Attitudes
The social and demographic characteristics of respondents as well as the attitudes 
they hold towards immigrants may influence both neighborhood choice and vot-
ing simultaneously. We therefore include these factors as covariates in all models. 
Socio-demographics include gender, age group (< 25; 26–35; 36–45; 46–55; 56–65; 
> 65), education (no education, professional certificate, baccalaureate, or higher 
education), current unemployment, and occupation (independent professions, man-
ager, intermediary professions, white collar, blue collar, retired, student, inactive). 
We further include an indicator of migrant background. The French Electoral Sur-
vey includes a question on the national origin of respondents’ parents and grand-
parents. Because African-origin immigrants and their descendants are among the 
4 The neighborhood level used most commonly in French research is the IRIS (Ilôts regroupés pour 
l’information statistique). Defined by the census bureau, IRIS are infra-municipality units of between 
1800 and 5000 inhabitants. All French municipalities of more than 10,000 inhabitants are divided into 
IRIS. For municipalities under 10,000 inhabitants, the municipality-level immigrant share/unemployment 
rate is used in lieu of the IRIS level.
5 Due to data availability, all French departments are included except for Corsica.
6 According to the definition commonly used in France, immigrants are individuals born outside of 
France without French citizenship at birth. The census does not count second generation immigrants.
7 Because our contextual variables of interest may also be correlated with different degrees of organi-
zational and network power of the Front national party across geographical areas, we ran a robustness 
check to ensure whether our main results hold if this factor is included. We measure party power using 
the vote share obtained by the Front National in the 2015 regional elections, measured at the depart-
mental level. Results are included in Table 6 in the Appendix. Our main results related to the impact of 




most discriminated against and segregated in French society (Safi and Simon 2013; 
McAvay and Safi 2018), we distinguish respondents of African origin (1) versus 
those with no identifiable migrant background (“the majority”) or with a European 
or other origin (0).
We also include a scale of ethnic intolerance measured in Wave 1 (November 
2015). The scale is constructed from five items: “There are too many immigrants 
in France”; “Islam is a threat to the West”; “French natives should have priority in 
employment compared to foreigners”; “Immigration is a source of cultural enrich-
ment”; and “Children of immigrants born in France are as French as anyone else.” 
The two last items were reverse coded. Each of these items is measured with 5-point 
Likert scales and yield a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on all variables.
Estimation Strategy
We ran a multilevel logistic regression model predicting the far-right vote. The mul-
tilevel model is a three-level random intercept model that accounts for the nested 
structure of the data: individuals are clustered within neighborhoods and within 
departments. Given that people within the same neighborhoods or departments 
likely share similar observed or unobserved characteristics, using a basic logistic 
regression would violate the assumption of independence between observations. 
Intra-class correlations calculated from the base multilevel model containing no pre-
dictors show that about 8% of unexplained variance in voting can be accounted for 
by the neighborhood level (Table 4). Further descriptive statistics on the distribution 
of cases per level are reported in Table 5. Models are estimated using Stata’s melogit 
command.
Results
Table  2 reports multilevel models predicting the likelihood of voting for Le Pen. 
We construct the model incrementally by first focusing on the effect of neighbor-
hood immigration (M1a), adding other contextual-level characteristics (M1b), and 
including individual-level demographics (M1c). The final specification (M1d) adds 
the scale of ethnic intolerance. As shown in M1c, individual-level covariates reveal 
significant effects previously documented in the literature. In line with past research, 
we find that older age groups and higher education correlate negatively with voting 
for Le Pen, and men are more likely to support the far right compared to women 
(Mayer 2018). Higher status occupations (managers and intermediary professions), 
students, and residents of large cities are less likely to support Le Pen. The same 
is true for African origin minorities, but this effect is largely eliminated after con-
trolling for ethnic intolerance in M1d. Overall, controlling for these individual-
level factors reduces the significance of the neighborhood immigrant share variable 
across models, indicating that some of the effect of local immigration is accounted 
for by sociodemographic variables that are decisive to locational outcomes and the 
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Table 1  Summary statistics on 
all variables
Source: The French Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017)
Mean SD
Vote choice
 Le Pen 0.18 0.38
Contextual characteristics
 Neighborhood immigrant share 0.08 0.07
 Department immigrant share 0.09 0.05
 Neighborhood unemployment rate 0.13 0.06
 Department unemployment rate 0.14 0.02
 Department Front National vote share 0.28 0.09
 City size
  Rural < 5000 inhabitants 0.19 0.40
  5000–10,000 inhabitants 0.12 0.33
  10,000–200,000 inhabitants 0.26 0.44
    > 200,000 0.43 0.49
Individual-level demographics
 Migrant background
 French majority or European origin 0.98 0.15
 African origin 0.02 0.15
 Male (dummy) 0.44 0.50
 Age





    > 65 0.14 0.35
 Education
  No education 0.04 0.20




  Independent professions 0.03 0.18
  Managers 0.14 0.35
  Intermediary professions 0.17 0.38
  White collar 0.20 0.40




  Unemployed (dummy) 0.04 0.19




Table 2  Multilevel model predicting the Le Pen vote
M1a M1b M1c M1d
Neighborhood level
 Immigrant share − 1.503*** − 2.189*** − 1.160* − 1.229*
(0.418) (0.517) (0.528) (0.624)
 Unemployment rate 1.027* 0.387 0.740
(0.472) (0.483) (0.581)
Department level
 Immigrant share 0.955 2.564** 2.439**
(0.877) (0.890) (0.919)
 Unemployment rate 8.794*** 8.771*** 7.252***
(1.803) (1.755) (1.765)
Individual level
 Female − 0.251*** − 0.169**
(0.053) (0.064)
Age group/ref: < 25
 26–35 − 0.176 − 0.057
(0.120) (0.147)
 36–45 − 0.280* − 0.112
(0.114) (0.140)
 46–55 − 0.502*** − 0.530***
(0.118) (0.145)
 56–65 − 0.817*** − 0.885***
(0.129) (0.158)
  > 65 − 1.243*** − 1.448***
(0.160) (0.193)
Education/ref: no education
 Professional certificate − 0.322** − 0.307*
(0.109) (0.131)
 High school diploma − 0.631*** − 0.565***
(0.114) (0.137)
 University − 1.263*** − 0.981***
(0.116) (0.138)
 Unemployed (dummy) 0.239* 0.300*
(0.117) (0.144)
Occcupation/ref: White collar
 Independent − 0.103 − 0.155
(0.135) (0.163)
 Managers − 0.774*** − 0.668***
(0.104) (0.124)
 Intermediary professions − 0.503*** − 0.316**
(0.086) (0.102)




vote. Further, as M1d shows, higher levels of intolerance towards immigrants and 
minorities is, unsurprisingly, positively associated with casting a vote for Le Pen. 
Yet again, accounting for levels of ethnic intolerance does not entirely absorb the 
effect of the neighborhood immigrant share. Hence, the impact of context displayed 
in these models cannot be explained solely by residential sorting, namely by the fact 
that respondents with certain sociodemographic or attitudinal profiles choose to live 
in immigrant areas.8
Table 2  (continued)
M1a M1b M1c M1d
 Retired − 0.168 − 0.185
(0.110) (0.130)
 Not working 0.161 0.058
(0.099) (0.121)
 Student − 0.936*** − 0.703***
(0.152) (0.189)
Migrant background/ref: majority or 
European origin
 African origin − 1.453*** − 0.402
(0.253) (0.291)
City size/ref: < 5000 inhabitants
 5000–10,000 0.040 0.071
(0.086) (0.104)
 10,000–200,000 − 0.088 − 0.057
(0.075) (0.090)




Constant − 1.476*** − 2.833*** − 1.134*** − 7.333***
(0.068) (0.257) (0.288) (0.408)
N 12,613 12,613 12,490 12,371
Model fit: AIC 11,670.16 11,644.34 10,867.52 8324.548
(LR test-Chi2) 98.07*** 52.41*** 34.18*** 14.64**
Source: The French Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017). Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
8 We estimate a final model that included all variables in Model 1c, with the addition of an interaction 
term between neighborhood immigrant share and migrant background. The full model is presented in 
Table 8 in the Appendix. The slope for the neighborhood immigrant share is negative and significant for 
the majority and European origin voters. This test provides further evidence of contact by illustrating that 
the negative association between local immigration and the far-right vote is not driven by minorities liv-
ing in these neighborhoods.
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The contextual effects relating to our main hypotheses are explored using pre-
dicted probability graphs computed from the main model (M1c). Figure  1 shows 
the probability of voting for the far right by the neighborhood immigrant share (left 
panel) and the department immigrant share (right panel). The x-axis plots the mean, 
one standard deviation below the mean as well as three standard deviations above 
the mean of the immigrant share variables. The results indicate contrasting patterns 
according to scale. In line with the contact hypothesis  (H1), voters in immigrant-
dense neighborhoods are less likely to cast a vote for the far right compared to peo-
ple living in local areas with lower shares of immigrants. Net of other factors, the 
average predicted probability of voting for Le Pen drops by nearly 5% points among 
residents of neighborhoods with 1% of immigrants compared to those living in areas 
with 29% of immigrants.
However, department-level immigration exerts an opposite and stronger effect 
on the likelihood of supporting the far right. In this case, a positive correlation is 
observed between high immigration and far-right voting, suggesting ethnic threat 
 (H2). The predicted likelihood of voting for Le Pen increases on average by about 
8% points between voters in departments with low shares of immigrants (4%) and 
those with high levels of immigration (24%). These findings are in line with the halo 
effect literature that posits that the far-right vote increases in places that are close to 
immigrant-dense areas rather than in immigrant-dense areas themselves.
Figure  2 illustrates the association between unemployment rates and the prob-
ability of voting for the far right, again at both the neighborhood (left panel) and 
Fig. 1  Predicted probabilities of voting for the far right by levels of immigration. Source: The French 
Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017)
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department (right panel) levels. Controlling for other factors, we find no significant 
effect of the neighborhood unemployment rate. Voters living in disadvantaged local 
areas (31% unemployment) have about equal chances of voting for Le Pen than those 
from less deprived spaces (7% unemployment). Yet, again the findings indicate a 
different pattern at the broader level of the department. Voters from departments hit 
hard by unemployment have on average about a 25% chance of voting for Le Pen, 
while the probability is only 16% for voters in low-unemployment areas  (H4). The 
department unemployment rate produces the greatest variation in the probability of 
voting for Le Pen compared to all other contextual variables.
Up until now the results suggest a negative association between immigration 
at the neighborhood level and voting for the far right and a positive association 
between immigration and unemployment at the department level and voting for this 
party. Given that direct contact with immigrants reduces voters’ chances of support-
ing the far right, we further expect that department level ethnic threat processes will 
be canceled out by regular contact. We test this hypothesis by introducing an inter-
action between neighborhood and department level immigrant shares (full model 
results are included in Table 7 in the Appendix).
Figure  3 illustrates the results from this interaction. The change in probability 
in voting for Le Pen associated with an increase in department level immigration 
is positive and significant for voters living in most neighborhoods. However, in 
neighborhoods with an above-average level of immigration, the positive effect of 
the department on far-right voting is no longer found. This finding suggests that 
Fig. 2  Predicted probabilities of voting for the far right by levels of unemployment. Source: The French 
Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017)
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adherence to radical right parties is triggered specifically among voters who have 
no frequent direct contacts with immigrants but are sensitive to their presence in 
surrounding areas. On the other hand, the department level effect of immigration is 
not salient among voters who have direct contact with immigrants, i.e. when neigh-
borhood immigration is high. Contact therefore eliminates the association between 
immigration and far-right voting that is visible at the level of the department  (H3).
Discussion and Conclusion
The consequences of immigration and economic hardship for the changing political 
landscape of contemporary democracies are widely discussed both in and outside of 
the social sciences. While many studies exist on this topic, the extant literature has 
come up with contrasting conclusions about the impact of contextual variables on 
voting behavior. Drawing on the economic competition, contact theory and ethnic 
threat perspectives, this article examined the role of immigration and unemployment 
in voters’ residential environments using the case of the 2017 French presidential 
election. Using survey data matched with the census, we simultaneously accounted 
for the effects of these variables at two spatial scales, the neighborhood and the 
department, in a multilevel model. We find that voters in neighborhoods with high 
levels of immigration were less likely to vote for the far right, in line with con-
tact theory. However, contrasting patterns emerged at the department level, where 
Fig. 3  Marginal effect of the department immigrant share by neighborhood immigration Source: The 
French Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017)
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increased immigration correlated with higher support for Le Pen. Yet residents of 
neighborhoods with high share of immigrants still had reduced chances of voting for 
Le Pen, even when they came from ethnically diverse departments.
These findings bear important implications for the empirical assessment of eco-
nomic competition, contact theory and ethnic threat. First, models should combine 
individual and contextual level data and account for multiple spatial scales at once. 
Second, while most prior studies have assessed contact theory by drawing on broad 
residential environments, levels of immigration need to be captured within neigh-
borhoods where interactions are most likely to occur. Our results point to the con-
clusion that ethnic threat and contact theory are not mutually exclusive patterns, 
but rather simultaneous processes that operate at different spatial scales. This find-
ing joins prior studies from France using aggregate-level data (Della Posta 2013; 
Rojon 2013) and resonates with research indicating the existence of halo effects on 
far-right voting (Rydgren and Ruth 2013). Voters who live in low-diversity local 
environments but feel “surrounded” by immigrants in the broader area seem to be 
more susceptible to the platforms of far-right parties.
This study nonetheless suffers from methodological limitations, which provide 
avenues for further research. While we have accounted for individual characteristics 
such as socio-demographics and ethnic intolerance that may influence residential 
sorting, due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, the patterns relating to local 
immigration and unemployment shown here cannot be interpreted as fully causal 
effects given the endogeneity of locational choice and the vote. Residential mobil-
ity patterns also intervene in the interpretation of our findings. In particular, given 
evidence of white flight in France (Rathelot and Safi 2014; McAvay 2018), vot-
ers who harbor negative attitudes towards immigrants may move out of immigrant 
dense neighborhoods. This would contribute to a form of geographical polarization 
whereby more ethnically tolerant voters live (and remain) in immigrant areas while 
more intolerant voters choose to settle in spaces with fewer immigrants. Our data do 
not include information on neighborhood-level residential mobility that would allow 
us to account for such processes. We are thus not fully able to identify whether the 
evidence of contact theory found here reflects a pure contextual effect or residential 
sorting. Future research could use longitudinal data in order to investigate whether 
residential mobility over time leads to individual changes in voting behavior (Gal-
lego et al. 2016). A panel design would also enable the salience-of-change hypoth-
esis to be investigated (Newman and Velez 2014). Our finding that the likelihood of 
voting for the far right is lower in immigrant neighborhoods does not exclude the 
possibility that areas experiencing rapid increases in immigration will change citi-
zens’ voting behavior. Future research could determine whether changes in the local 
immigrant composition over time predict individual-level increases in far-right vot-
ing, while accounting for residential mobility patterns such as white flight.
Future research could also seek to identify additional conditions under which 
economic competition, ethnic threat and contact might operate. For instance, 
studies could investigate whether living in disadvantaged areas shapes percep-
tions of economic competition or threat differently across occupational groups 
or personality types. Moreover, research could explore how economic competi-
tion and ethnic threat interact at various spatial scales. Further, quantitative and 
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qualitative work is necessary to more directly uncover the psychological appa-
ratus of contact. For instance, what role does the type and frequency of contact 
between natives and immigrants (e.g. in the neighborhood, at the workplace, in 
schools or in the public space—see for instance Enos 2017) play in the develop-
ment of tolerance (or ethnic animus)? This would advance our understanding of 
the precise conditions under which contact transforms attitudes and would offer 
a more direct test of contact theory.
Finally, with some rare exceptions (Edo et al. 2019), extant research on con-
textual effects has solely focused on the far right. Further extensions of this 
research could use combined individual and contextual level data to explore how 
neighborhood immigration or unemployment have electoral consequences that 
extend to the full range of the political spectrum.
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 Men/18–24 − 0.5 Region Île-de-France 0.7 Vote in the First 




N. Arthaud − 0.1
 Men/25–34 − 1.6 Centre Val de 
Loire
0.4 P. Poutou − 0.1
 Men/35–49 1.1 Bourgogne 
France-Comté
− 0.1 JL. Melenchon − 2
 Men/50–64 − 0.2 Normandie − 0.4 F. Hollande 2.9
 Men/65+ − 2.6 Nord Pas-de-Cal-
ais Picardie
0.6 E. Jolly 0.8
 Women/18–24 0.7 Alsace Cham-
pagne-Ardenne 
Lorraine
0.3 F. Bayrou 0.7
 Women/25–34 2 Pays de la Loire 0.8 N. Sarkozy − 0.3
 Women/35–49 4 Bretagne 0.4 N. Dupont-Aignan 0.3
 Women/50–64 1.5 Aquitaine Lim-
ousin Poitou–
Charentes
− 1 M. Le Pen − 1.6

































 Managers 4.2 Level of education No diploma − 19.1
 Intermediate 
professions
4.2 BEPC, CAP, BEP − 7.3
 Employees 4.2 Bac 1.7







Table 4  Intra-class correlations 
for the empty multilevel model
Source: The French Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017)
Level ICC SE 95% CI
Department 0.032 0.007 [0.020–0.050]
Neighborhood 0.082 0.039 [0.032–0.197]
Table 5  Number of cases within 
neighborhood and department 
levels in multilevel analysis 
(M1c)
Source: The French Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017)
Level Number of groups Mean Min Max
Department 94 132.9 12 603
Neighborhood 10,095 1.2 1 8
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Table 6  Multilevel model 
predicting the Le Pen Vote 
(controlling for department-level 
Front National vote share)
Vote for Le Pen
Neighborhood level







 Unemployment rate − 0.573
(1.502)














  > 65 − 1.241***
(0.160)
Education/ref: no education
 Professional certificate − 0.326**
(0.109)
























Migrant background/ref: majority or European 
origin
 African origin − 1.437***
(0.253)










Model fit: AIC 10,817.58
(LR test-Chi2) 0.34
Source: The French Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017). Standard 
errors in parentheses
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
1 3
Political Behavior 
Table 7  Multilevel model 
predicting the Le Pen Vote 
including an interaction between 
department and neighborhood 
immigration
Vote for Le Pen
Neighborhood level
 Neighborhood immigrant share 0.758
(0.909)
 Neighborhood unemployment rate 0.203
(0.485)
Department level
 Department immigrant share 4.126***
(1.043)
 Department unemployment rate 9.144***
(1.664)
Interaction
















  > 65 − 1.240***
(0.160)
Education/ref: no education
 Professional certificate − 0.322**
(0.109)











 Intermediary professions − 0.503***
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Migrant background/ref: majority or European 
origin
 African origin − 1.443***
(0.253)










Model fit: AIC 10,863.1
(LR test-Chi2) 21.98***
Source: The French Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017). Standard 
errors in parentheses
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
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Table 8  Multilevel model predicting the Le Pen vote including an interaction between neighborhood 
immigration and migrant background
Vote for Le Pen
Interaction
 Effect of African origin − 1.502***
(0.406)
 Neighborhood immigrant share x majority/European − 1.168*
(0.531)
 Neighborhood immigrant share x African origin − 0.774
(2.529)
Neighborhood level
 Neighborhood unemployment rate 0.386
(0.483)
Department level
 Department unemployment rate 8.771***
(1.755)














   > 65 − 1.243***
(0.160)
Education/ref: no education
 Professional certificate − 0.321**
(0.109)
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Table 8  (continued)
Vote for Le Pen
 Managers − 0.774***
(0.104)





















Model fit: AIC 10,869.5
Source: The French Electoral Survey, Wave 14 (2017). Standard errors in parentheses
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